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ABSTRACT 
IAN JAMES CONLON: Concrete Language and Sexual Prejudice 
(Under the direction of Andrew Perrin) 
This paper examines the role of concrete terminology in survey research and its relationship 
to prejudicial response. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, I 
examine responses to two similarly worded items about same-sex marriage. The two 
questions had near-identical wording, with the only exception being the terms used to refer to 
describe same-sex couples. The first wording asked about “gays and lesbians,” whereas the 
second asked about “two men” or “two women.” Drawing on research in cognitive 
psychology, I hypothesize that opposition to the second wording will be higher and more 
extreme because the wording is more concrete and thus more likely to evoke visualization. 
Additionally, I hypothesize that respondents from sociodemographic groups associated with 
heightened sexual prejudice will be disproportionately affected by the concrete wording. The 
results confirm both hypotheses. Implications for survey response and limitations of the 
current study are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of question wording is not unique to the design process, nor is an 
examination of wording effects relevant only to survey methodology. A question about an 
issue worded one way can produce a disparate response from a differently worded question 
dealing with the same issue. Previous research on question wording effects, being conducted 
almost exclusively by survey methodologists, has focused on the potential for subtle 
differences to produce disparate response, with the ultimate goal of the research being the 
development of better questionnaires. But disparate response to differently worded questions 
can illuminate more than whether one question wording is superior to another. Indeed, 
disparate response indicates that survey respondents understand questions differently and 
undergo a different social-psychological process in formulating their response. 
 In this paper, I use data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study to explore 
differences in response to two questions dealing with same-sex marriage. The two questions 
employ near-identical wording, with the only exception being the terms used to describe 
same-sex couples. The first question asked respondents whether “gays and lesbians” should 
be allowed to marry, whereas the second asked about “two men” and “two women.” 
Drawing upon and synthesizing research from survey methodology, cognitive 
psychology, and linguistics, I argue that the second wording, because it employed concrete 
terminology associated with heightened mental imagery, should provoke heightened 
opposition. Moreover, I argue that the wording effect should positively correlate with 
 2 
predictors of sexual prejudice, as people inclined to higher levels of sexual prejudice should 
be expected to find the associated mental image more displeasing. Therefore, I expect 
respondents with sociodemographic characteristics and salient identities that correspond to 
heightened sexual prejudice to be more strongly affected by the concrete wording. 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
The debate over same-sex marriage is only the latest issue in an ongoing struggle for 
gay rights. Previous issues included the right to freely engage in sexual relations, which 
gained national recognition following the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986). In the Bowers decision, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not 
provide protection for acts of sodomy. The 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
overturned the Bowers decision, holding that the Due Process Clause grants consenting 
individuals the right to engage in acts of sodomy without interference from the government 
(539 U.S. 558). In addition, in the past two decades, homosexuals have made a significant 
push for the right to serve in the military and for laws forbidding employment discrimination. 
 By contrast, the issue of same-sex marriage has only recently achieved national 
attention. Not until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s controversial 2003 decision, 
which ruled the state’s ban on gay marriage unconstitutional, did the issue of gay marriage 
come to the forefront of American political discourse. Public outcry following the decision 
led conservative politicians to propose legislative barriers. Legislatures in eleven states 
developed ballot initiatives to ban same-sex marriage, and on the national level, President 
Bush stepped up efforts to pursue an amendment to the Constitution that would codify 
marriage as only between a man and a woman. The issue of same-sex marriage quickly 
became a hot button issue in the 2004 campaign. 
 Since exploding onto the national scene in 2003, same-sex marriage has received 
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little public support. Polling on the issue has been consistent, with a majority of Americans 
opposing the recognition of same-sex marriages (ABC News/Washington Post Poll). Paul 
Brewer and Clyde Wilcox (2005) observe that polling data from the early 1990s closely 
resemble current figures and suggest that there may have been a slight increase in opposition 
over the period. Nearly equal numbers support as oppose an amendment to the Constitution 
that would codify marriage as a union between a man and a woman, thereby excluding same-
sex marriage from consideration by individual states (Gallup Poll). Opposition to same-sex 
marriage, however, does not necessitate opposition to gay civil unions, and polls indicate that 
a majority of Americans support at least partial legal recognition of same-sex couples 
(Brewer and Wilcox 2005). Moreover, data show that the public supports granting same-sex 
spouses inheritance rights, Social Security benefits, health insurance, and other employee 
benefits (Newsweek Poll). 
Psychology of Survey Response 
Beginning in the 1980s, survey methodologists began to devote considerable attention 
to the psychological processes that underlie survey response. Methodologists looked to the 
insights of cognitive psychology to inform their understanding, initiating a movement that 
has become known as the cognitive aspects of survey methodology, or CASM, movement 
(Sirken et al. 1999; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). Prevailing theories of survey 
response provided by CASM researchers emphasize the systematic process that respondents 
follow when responding to questions. 
 Although there exist several theories of survey response that draw on cognitive 
psychology, most include three primary processes: comprehension of the question, retrieval 
of relevant information, and response (e.g., Cannell, Miller, and Oksenberg 1981; 
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Tourangeau 1984; Turner and Martin 1984). Comprehension of the question consists of 
developing an understanding of the lexical and syntactical elements of the question as well as 
determining its dominant theme. Retrieval refers to the recall of relevant information from 
long-term memory. Finally, the response stage consists of the respondent relaying her answer 
to the interviewer. For my analysis, I focus exclusively on the first two stages, as these are 
most likely to be associated with wording effects (Holleman 2000). 
In the comprehension stage, respondents seek to develop an understanding of the 
question being asked (Clark 1985; Graesser, McMahen, and Johnson 1994). In this stage, 
factors such as the vocabulary level of the respondent and the complexity of the question’s 
syntactical structure are of importance (Cannell et al. 1981). Vague and ambiguous language 
can pose difficulties for respondents at this stage in the response process. Take, for example, 
the seemingly simple question: “In the past month, how many times have you visited the 
doctor for your health?” In comprehending this question, the respondent may wonder what 
constitutes a visitation. She may wonder whether an informal visit to obtain medical records 
or a visit to her chiropractor should be included in the tabulation. Moreover, the time referent 
of “past month” is ambiguous. Does “past month” refer to the previous calendar month, the 
30 days prior to the date of the interview, or something else? Thus, ambiguous or vague 
terminology can lead respondents to misunderstand or misinterpret the nature of the question. 
When survey methodologists refer to the importance of standardized wording in 
questionnaires, what they really hope to ensure is standardized comprehension. 
The second stage of the response process involves retrieval of information relevant to 
the concept in question. During this stage, respondents recall relevant information from long-
term memory. Processes at this stage include adopting a retrieval strategy, generating 
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retrieval cues to produce recall, and filling in partial memories through inference 
(Tourangeau et al. 2000). With regard to questions about subjective phenomena, researchers 
are divided as to how respondents retrieve relevant information. Some researchers, taking 
their cue from Philip Converse’s (1964, 1970) research on non-attitudes, argue that many 
respondents do not have stable attitudes and that responses shift too dramatically over time to 
be trusted (e.g., Tourangeau et al. 2000). As a result, responses are created at the time of the 
survey. Other researchers contend that respondents have preexisting attitudes that are stable 
over time and, they argue, survey researchers can effectively tap these underlying attitudes 
with carefully crafted questions. Under this view, attitudes are seen as an association between 
some object or issue and the respondent’s evaluation of it. 
I am more sympathetic to the view that respondents can and do provide stable 
responses to attitudinal survey questions, especially for salient issues like same-sex marriage. 
Contrary to the assertion made by Converse regarding the non-existence and volatility of 
attitudes, research has shown that the mass public do have meaningful and stable attitudes 
(Judd and Milburn 1980). Indeed, in a comprehensive analysis of public opinion, Page and 
Shapiro (1992) found a “remarkable degree of stability in Americans’ collective policy 
preferences” (p. 45). In fact, nearly two-thirds of the attitudinal questions in their analysis 
that dealt with domestic issues showed no significant change in public opinion. Moreover, 
research has demonstrated that attitudes, especially attitudes that are highly accessible, can be 
automatically activated (Fazio 1989; Krosnick 1989). For example, one experiment found 
that the repeated expression of an attitude produced faster responses to questions about it 
(Fazio et al. 1982). A later experiment demonstrated that attitude targets affected a 
respondent’s ability to classify adjectives (Fazio and Williams 1986). In this experiment, 
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respondents were provided targets based on their associated attitude (e.g., spider or landlord) 
as well as corresponding adjectives (e.g., appealing or appalling). In cases where respondents 
were provided a discordant pair, such as spider-appealing, they were slower to classify the 
adjective. By contrast, when the noun-adjective pair was concordant, such as spider-
appalling, respondents classified adjectives faster.  
Within this understanding of attitude retrieval, there are competing explanations as to 
the nature of the relationship between attitude and object. One view argues that attitudinal 
responses correspond to specific beliefs about the construct in question (Tourangeau and 
Rasinski 1988), whereas another suggests that responses derive from general values and 
predispositions (Zaller 1992). For the sake of my analysis, either response process is 
acceptable. Regardless of the exact process by which respondents reach their reported 
opinion, the concrete wording of the second question ought to provoke a more extreme 
response. Nevertheless, my hypothesis stands more in the tradition of the general values and 
predispositions approach. Particularly, I draw on the application of this approach by Kristin 
Luker (1985) in her examination of public opinion surrounding abortion. She found that 
attitudes toward abortion derive primarily from views about religion, the role of women, and 
sexual freedom. In adapting this approach to the issue of same-sex marriage, I argue that the 
second, more concrete wording—“two men” or “two women”—will be more likely to 
produce strong opposition among people with salient religious identities or other group 
memberships associated with decreased tolerance for gay people. 
Question Wording 
Difficulties encountered at either the comprehension or retrieval stage of the response 
process can lead to response effects. Questions may contain terms unfamiliar to respondents 
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or syntactic structures that obscure the question’s focus, leading to problems in 
comprehension. Similarly, alternate wordings can lead respondents to retrieve and employ 
different values and predispositions in formulating their response. Previous research has 
effectively demonstrated that changes, however subtle, to a question’s wording can produce 
different results (e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981). But whereas previous research on 
wording effects has dealt with asymmetrical responses and loaded phrases, I propose a 
different form of wording effect. I explore the extent to which terminology used to refer to 
the concept in question can shape respondents’ understanding of the concept and thus elicit 
different responses. Rather than isolate discrepant response by wording, I use the observed 
discrepancy to demonstrate the role of mental imagery in triggering sexual prejudice. 
Perhaps the closest comparison from previous research comes from Tom Smith’s 
(1987) examination of public opinion regarding federal assistance programs. Smith found 
that support for federal assistance programs was higher when respondents were asked about 
“assistance to the poor” than when they were asked about “welfare.” The reason for the 
discrepancy in response, Smith argues, is that the term “welfare” triggers more concerns 
about the cost and wastefulness of assistance services than does “assistance.” In the case of 
the same-sex marriage items in my analysis, I contend that the second question wording—
“two men” or “two women”—is more concrete in nature and thus more imaginable than the 
wording in the first question—“gays and lesbians.” I hypothesize that the imagery provoked 
by the second wording will trigger disgust, disproportionately among people inclined to 
greater sexual prejudice, and thus will lead them to report a more negative response. 
 Words are powerful, but, as any good writer knows, they are not equally powerful. 
Some words can elicit mental and even physiological reactions, whereas others produce 
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hardly any effect at all. One dimension along which words differ is their capacity to create 
mental images (e.g., Sadoski and Paivio 2001). Research in cognitive psychology has 
explored this phenomenon at length and has found key differences in the quality of words 
and their propensity to produce a mental image. Most relevant to my analysis is the fact that 
voluminous research has shown that concrete words are more readily imaged than abstract 
concepts (e.g., Abernethy 1991; Paivio and Csapo 1973; Richardson 1980).  
With regard to the questions in my analysis, I contend that “men” and “women” are 
more concrete terms than “gays” and “lesbians.” In fact, previous research has demonstrated 
that the words “men” and “women” are associated with heightened levels of imagery 
(Abernethy 1991; Bellezza, Greenwald, and Banaji 1986). Neither “gay” nor “lesbian” has 
been tested in similar experiments. Nevertheless, it would seem that neither word could 
evoke as clear an image as “man” or “woman,” and the reason is simple: the terms “gay” and 
“lesbian” do not function only as nouns. Instead, they can and often do function as adjectives. 
In their nominal form, the words refer merely to abstracted roles, much in the same way as 
the terms “heterosexual” and “bisexual.” But, as with words like “heterosexual” and 
“bisexual,” the nominal form of “gay” and “lesbian” is not so well-defined as to be readily 
associated with an image. What does a “heterosexual” look like? 
It is only in their adjectival form that words like “heterosexual” and “gay” evoke a 
mental image, and even here, the resulting image is more the result of the modified noun. For 
example, in the phrase “gay man” or “gay couple,” the element of the phrase that elicits a 
mental image is not the adjective “gay.” On the contrary, the nouns “man” and “couple” 
produce the image, as they are concrete terms for which we have a preexisting mental 
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concept. The adjective “gay” only informs us of the sort of “man” or “couple” that is to be 
imaged. Yet even here, it is unclear how “gay” would modify the image produced. 
The distinction between the adjectival and nominal forms of “gay” and “lesbian” is 
significant because, in the case of the question asked of respondents, the terms were used in 
their more abstracted, less imaginable nominal form. Respondents were asked, “Would you 
favor or oppose a law in your state that would allow gays and lesbians to marry a partner of 
the same sex?” Nothing in this question is so evocative as to elicit a mental image. By 
contrast, the second wording asked respondents about “two men” or “two women.” Here, the 
mental image can hardly be avoided. The terms “men” and “women” are readily imaged, and 
the adjective “two” clearly indicates the form of the image: not one man or woman, but two. 
Factor in that the question concerns the institution of marriage, and the context in which 
these “two men” and “two women” are to be pictured also becomes clear. 
Why should the more concrete, more easily visualized question wording about same-
sex marriage be expected to elicit a more oppositional response? To inform this hypothesis, I 
draw upon a growing body of psychological research that explores the role that disgust plays 
in moral valuation. In a recent treatise on the subject, William Ian Miller notes, “Disgust 
figures centrally in our everyday moral discourse: along with indignation it gives voice to our 
strongest sentiments of moral disapprobation” (1997). To be sure, much of the discourse 
about same-sex marriage is rife with the language of disgust. Terms like “abomination” and 
“disgusting” are frequently used by opponents of same-sex marriage to describe the gay 
lifestyle and to provide some justification, however ill-formed, for their opposition. Indeed, 
the language of disgust has crept into the moral vocabulary of American youth as well, with 
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over one-third of high school seniors agreeing with the statement, “Gay men are disgusting” 
(Gilbert 2006).1 
But the language and expression of disgust is relative, varying historically and 
culturally (Miller 1997). Moreover, the extent to which disgust informs moral valuation is 
not distributed equally among people within the same society. Recent research in social 
psychology has explored the degree to which disgust sensitivity differs by sociodemographic 
group. In particular, self-identified conservatives were found to be more likely than self-
identified liberals to declare as relevant to an action’s moral valuation whether it is deemed 
“disgusting” (Haidt and Graham 2007). Subsequent research has demonstrated that, for 
political conservatives, the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political opinion is 
strongest for sociomoral issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage (Inbar, Pizarro, and 
Bloom in progress). As for the evaluation of imagery, research has shown that people who 
are intolerant of homosexuality tend to evaluate homoerotic imagery less favorably than do 
people who hold tolerant attitudes (Bhat, Leigh, and Wardlow 1996). 
Taking research on disgust sensitivity as a point of departure, I argue that the 
difference in the quality of language used in the two questions should produce a discrepancy 
in response. Because the second wording contains concrete language, which is more capable 
of evoking a mental image, it should produce a different response. Moreover, I hypothesize 
that the response differences should not be distributed at random but rather should correlate 
with predictors of sexual prejudice. In addition, respondents more inclined to sexual 
prejudice should be more likely to react to the resulting mental image with disgust and thus 
should provide a more opposed response. 
 
                                                 
1
 Twenty-eight percent agreed with the statement, “Lesbians are disgusting.” 
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Predictors of Sexual Prejudice 
A large body of psychological and sociological literature has explored the individual 
and group characteristics associated with heightened sexual prejudice. Although most adults 
in the United States hold a negative attitude toward homosexual behavior (Yang 1997), the 
attitudes are not distributed at random in society. Rather, there are patterned differences in 
levels of sexual prejudice across sociodemographic categories. I use the term sexual 
prejudice to refer to “all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation” (Herek 2000: 19). Of 
course, practically speaking, such prejudice in the United States is almost always directed 
toward people who engage in homosexual behaviors or define themselves as gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual. In this section, I provide a brief review of the literature on sexual prejudice. 
 Research has shown that higher levels of sexual prejudice are found among people 
who are older, less educated, living in the Midwest or South, and living in rural areas (Herek 
1994). In addition, men tend to exhibit higher levels of sexual prejudice than women (Herek 
and Capitanio 1999; Kite and Whitley 1998). The relationship between race and sexual 
prejudice is more nuanced. Some research has suggested that whites have significantly more 
negative attitudes toward homosexuality than blacks (Levitt and Klassen 1974), yet other 
research has found just the opposite (Hudson and Ricketts 1980; Schneider and Lewis 1984). 
Still other research found no statistically significant differences by race at all (Glenn and 
Weaver 1979; Irwin and Thompson 1977). Finally, since the 1980s, levels of sexual 
prejudice have increasingly begun to correlate with conservative political ideology and 
affiliation with the Republican Party (Yang 1998). 
 Of all predictors of sexual prejudice, however, none is more powerful than religiosity, 
and this relationship is well-documented. All three aspects of religiosity—belief, behavior, 
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and belonging—have been shown to correlate with sexual prejudice. In terms of belief, 
biblical literalism stands as the most significant predictor of antigay prejudice (Burdette, 
Ellison, and Hill 2005; Ellison and Musick 1993; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Religious service 
attendance tends to predict heightened sexual prejudice, with those attending services most 
frequently having the most prejudiced attitudes toward homosexuality (Beatty and Walter 
1984; Herek and Glunt 1993; Fisher et al. 1994). Finally, religious affiliation is also a 
consistent predictor of sexual prejudice, with membership in conservative religious 
denominations, such as Evangelical Protestantism, being a particularly strong predictor 
(Cochran and Beeghley 1991; Finlay and Walther 2003; Herek and Capitanio 1996).  
Hypotheses 
I hypothesize that sociodemographic characteristics that correlate with sexual prejudice 
should also be associated with more negative responses to the concrete question wording. 
Moreover, people with salient identities associated with heightened prejudice (e.g., a salient 
religious identity) should be disproportionately affected by the concrete question wording. 
Specifically, I hypothesize the following: 
1) Responses to the concrete version of the same-sex marriage question will be more 
strongly opposed than responses to the abstract version. 
2) The effect of the concrete wording will not be at random but rather will be 
disproportionately experienced among social groups associated with heightened 
sexual prejudice. Thus, in accordance with research on sexual prejudice (Herek 
1994), there will be stronger effects for men, the lesser educated, respondents from 
the South or Midwest, born-again Christians, frequent churchgoers, the religiously 
affiliated, political conservatives, and Republicans. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Data for my analysis come from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study 
(NAES). The NAES is one of the largest academic public opinion surveys ever conducted of 
the American public. Interviews for the NAES were conducted by computer-assisted 
telephone interview (CATI), and interviews took, on average, 30 minutes to complete. The 
national rolling cross-sectional portion of the NAES, which serves as the source for my data, 
consists of 81,422 interviews of randomly selected, non-institutionalized adults in the 48 
continental states and Washington, D.C. A rolling cross-sectional design is similar to a 
traditional cross-sectional design, but the day on which a respondent is interviewed is 
determined randomly (Johnston and Brady 2002). Interviews were conducted from October 
7, 2003 through November 16, 2004. Interviews were administered daily, with the exception 
of certain holidays,2 at an average of between 150 and 300 completed interviews per day. 
Each interview took an average of 30 minutes to complete.  
Respondents to the national rolling cross-section were selected using a random-digit 
dialing (RDD) procedure. The sampling frame consisted of a randomly generated list of 10-
digit telephone numbers.3 The first eight digits reflected estimated proportions of household 
phones beginning with those digits. The final two digits were generated entirely at random. 
                                                 
2
 The NAES did not collect data on the following dates: November 27, 2003 (Thanksgiving), December 24-25, 
2003 (Christmas), December 31, 2003-January 1, 2004 (New Year’s), April 11, 2004 (Easter), and July 4, 2004 
(Independence Day). 
 
3
 The sampling frame for the NAES was developed by Survey Sampling, Inc. of Westport, Connecticut. 
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Per United States government regulations, all known cell phone numbers were excluded from 
the frame. Upon reaching a household, interviewers asked to speak with an adult age 18 or 
older, and this person was then asked to indicate the number of adults in the household. One 
adult per household was selected to participate in the survey. Interviews for the NAES were 
conducted in either English or Spanish, depending on the preference of the respondent.  
The 2004 NAES had a response rate of 25 percent,4 which is considerably lower than 
other telephone-based surveys that employ a random-digit dialing method. Moreover, 
because only households with a telephone are eligible to participate, a small percentage of 
the population fell outside of the sampling frame. One recent estimate suggests that 95 
percent of all households in the United States contain telephones, leaving five percent of 
households, which are disproportionately low-income, beyond the scope of the survey 
(Casady and Lepkowski 1998).  
Although the survey had a rather low response rate and its RDD method precluded 
the participation of a segment of the population, I believe that these shortcomings pose little 
threat to my analysis for two reasons. First, I do not intend for my analysis to generalize to 
the entire population. Instead, I aim to explore the psychological processes associated with 
survey response. Neither a high response rate nor complete coverage of the population is 
necessary to demonstrate the existence of such processes. Second, research has shown that 
lower response rates do not necessarily produce less reliable findings (Curtin, Presser, and 
                                                 
4
 The 25 percent figure is based on a ratio of completed interviews to eligible households. I also calculated 
response rates using the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s (AAPOR) Standard Definitions, 
Version 3 (2004) and found the following: RR1, or minimum response rate (21.7 percent); RR2, which includes 
partial interviews as respondents (26 percent); RR3, which estimates what percentage of cases with unknown 
eligibility are eligible (23.5 percent); and RR4, which includes RR3 estimates and the partial interviews, as in 
RR2 (28.2 percent). 
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Singer 2000). In fact, studies with lower response rates have been found to produce nearly 
identical measurements of most social and political attitudes (Keeter et al. 2000). 
Measurement of Variables 
The dependent variables in my analysis are two similarly worded questions in the 
2004 NAES that deal with same-sex marriage (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The first 
version of the question asked, “Would you favor or oppose a law in your state that would 
allow gays and lesbians to marry a partner of the same sex?” Valid responses were either 
“favor” or “oppose.” This version was asked of 8,550 respondents, 7,836 (91.64 percent) of 
whom provided a valid response.5 The second version of the question asked, “Would you 
favor or oppose a law in your state that would allow two men to marry each other or two 
women to marry each other?” This version was asked of 12,176 respondents, 11,107 (91.22 
percent) of whom provided a valid response.6  
For both question wordings, the order of “favor” and “oppose” was randomized to 
remove any systematic bias associated with always reading one before the other. In addition, 
for both questions, if respondents provided a valid response, they were then asked, “Is that 
strongly [favor/oppose] or somewhat [favor/oppose]?” Arranging the data in this way, the 
questions have four valid response categories: strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat 
oppose, and strongly oppose. Responses are coded 1-4 from “strongly favor” to “strongly 
oppose.” The total number of respondents that provided a valid response to either question 
wording was 18,943. Adding all covariates to the analysis, deleting missing cases listwise, 
                                                 
5
 Five-hundred-seventy-eight (578) respondents (6.76 percent of total) provided a response of “don’t know,” 
and 136 (1.59 percent) refused to answer. 
 
6
 Eight-hundred-forty-three (843) respondents (6.92 percent of total) provided a response of “don’t know,” and 
226 (1.86 percent) refused to answer. 
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produces a final analytic sample of 16,003, or 84.4 percent of valid responses to the same-sex 
marriage items.7 
I selected the independent variables for my analysis based on their relationship to 
sexual prejudice. Demographically, I include controls for gender (female=1), age 
(continuous), and race. My measure of race has three categories: white, black, and “other.” 
The category for “other” comprises Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and respondents 
who provided the response of “some other race.”8  
I also include a measure of educational attainment. My measure of education consists 
of four categories, arranged by highest degree obtained. The reference category for my 
variable is “high school graduate or less.” Other categories are some college, bachelor’s 
degree, and graduate or professional degree. The category for “some college” includes 
respondents who attended technical or vocational school after high school and those who 
received an associate’s or two-year degree. The category for “bachelor’s degree” includes 
respondents who attended graduate or professional school but did not obtain a degree. 
My analysis includes one contextual variable that has been shown to correlate with 
sexual prejudice. For geographical context, I include a variable consisting of the four Census 
regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). I set Northeast as the reference category.  
With regard to religious variables, I include three measures designed to tap 
respondents’ belief, behavior, and belonging. The 2004 NAES does not contain a measure of 
                                                 
7
 I recognize that this means that a fairly high proportion of valid responses was deleted as a result of missing 
data. To assess whether their removal biased the distribution of either of the dependent variables, I ran chi-
square tests comparing the distribution of valid responses for each question to the responses included in the 
analytic sample. Neither test was significant. I also ran tests for all independent variables, finding that my 
sample contains more white respondents, fewer black respondents, and a greater proportion of religious 
respondents. 
 
8
 I include respondents with “other” racial identities not to generalize about their propensity to be affected by 
the question wording, but rather to retain them in the sample. Regardless of statistical significance, I do not 
interpret the coefficients associated with this racial category. 
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biblical literalism, so as a proxy measure, I use a question that asked, “Do you consider 
yourself an evangelical or born-again Christian?” Research has shown that self-identified 
evangelicals and born-again Christians are likely to hold a literalist view of the Bible (Wilcox 
and Jelen 1990), so I believe that my measure provides a reasonable proxy for biblical 
literalism. The frequency of church attendance measure that I employ is a three-category 
ordinal measure, consisting of “never” (reference), “infrequent,” “weekly or more.”9 Finally, 
I include a variable for religious affiliation. Unfortunately, the measurement of affiliation in 
the 2004 NAES is not precise enough to permit me to arrange categories according to the 
prevailing method (Steensland et al. 2000). Instead, I divide respondents into six broad 
groupings: Protestant (reference), Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, and no affiliation.10 
Finally, I include measures of political ideology and party affiliation. For political 
ideology, respondents were asked, “Generally speaking, would you describe your political 
views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” I collapse the 
categories into three: conservative (reference), moderate, and liberal. Party affiliation was 
determined by asking, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, 
a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?” I include all four valid responses in my 
analysis, but because the “Independent” and “something else” categories are too vaguely 
defined, I will not interpret their coefficients. I set Republican as the reference category. 
 
                                                 
9
 I constructed these categories from a standard five-category measure. The “infrequent” category includes 
respondents who indicated that they attend “a few times a year” or “once or twice a month.” The “weekly or 
more” category includes respondents who said they attend “once a week” or “more than once a week.” 
 
10
 The category “no affiliation” includes respondents who claimed no denomination as well as respondents who 
identified as atheist or agnostic. Note: the response of “no denomination” should not be confused with the 
growing number of conservative Protestants who classify themselves as “non-denominational.” Rather, this 
group contains respondents who indicated that they never attend religious services and, when asked for their 
denominational affiliation, responded “no denomination.” 
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Analytic Techniques 
My analysis is divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss the univariate 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in the analysis. In the second 
section, I determine whether the second question wording significantly affected responses by 
running a bivariate crosstabulation followed by a multivariate model with all controls to see 
whether question wording remains a significant predictor. Because the dependent variable in 
my analysis is ordinal in nature, I use ordered logistic regression (OLR). The formula for the 
ordinal logistic regression is as follows:  
log( ) '
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j i
ij
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−
, where i refers to individual i and j refers to the number of response 
categories in the dependent variable. The coefficients from an OLR, reported as odds-ratios, 
are interpreted as the effect that a one-unit increase in the independent variable would have 
on the odds of being in a higher, and thus more opposed, response category.11 I then run 
separate OLR models by question wording and use the coefficients from each model to 
calculate predicted probabilities for selected subsamples, comparing probabilities by the 
question wording the respondent received.12 Because my analysis deals primarily with 
opposition to same-sex marriage, and extreme opposition in particular, I focus exclusively on 
the “strongly oppose” response category when examining predicted probabilities.13 In the 
                                                 
11
 Although the coefficient can be interpreted as an increase from category 1 to category 2, 3, or 4, from 
category 1 or 2 to category 3 or 4, and so on, I refer only to an increase in the odds of being in category 1, 2, or 
3 compared to being in category 4, the category of most extreme opposition. 
 
12
 I use the SPost command “prvalue” in Stata to estimate predicted probabilities, imputing group mean values 
for all variables other than those isolating the subsample. 
 
13
 To determine whether the difference in predicted probabilities is statistically significant, I rely on the delta 
method of estimating confidence intervals to determine whether the intervals of the two predicted probabilities 
overlap, which indicates that the probability difference is not statistically significant. 
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final section of my analysis, I run individual OLR models for selected subsamples to 
determine whether question wording had any differential effect by subgroup.14 
                                                 
14
 For the predicted probabilities analysis and the subsample regression models, I limit my analysis to two 
categories for each variable, with the exception of region. For all other variables with more than two categories, 
I compare only the upper and lower extremes. The results of my subsample analysis can only be seen as 
suggestive of difference across subgroups. A more formal test would be to run full models with interaction 
effects for each variable of interest. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The frequency distributions for all independent variables in my analysis can be seen 
in Table 1. From the table, we can see that women predominate in the sample, making up 55 
percent of respondents. In addition, my data are not racially representative of the national 
population, with a greater proportion of my respondents being white. In terms of education, 
respondents with a high school degree or less constitute a plurality of the sample. Regionally, 
most respondents in the sample hail from the South, and the overall sample distribution 
closely resembles 2004 regional population parameters provided by the Bureau of the 
Census. A little over one-third of respondents in the analytic sample identify as born-again 
Christians, and 80 percent indicated that they attend religious services. The majority of 
respondents in my sample identify as Protestant, while only a small percentage identify as 
Jewish or Mormon.15 Politically, my sample is more conservative and more likely to identify 
as Republican than most national estimates of these variables. 
 Thus, it is clear that my sample deviates in many ways from being nationally 
representative. I do not believe that these differences compromise the validity of the 
subsequent analysis, however, as I do not intend for my analysis to generalize to the 
population in some representative manner. Rather, my interest lies in the psychology of 
survey response and the ways in which different subgroups are affected when presented with
                                                 
15
 Because so few respondents identify as Jewish or Mormon, I do not interpret the coefficients associated with 
these subgroups, nor do I include them in the subsequent comparison of predicted probabilities. Regardless, 
most research on sexual prejudice focuses on Protestants and Catholics, both of which are well-represented in 
my sample. 
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an alternative question wording. The exact distribution between groups is immaterial; what 
matters is that I have a sufficient number of respondents from each subgroup of interest to 
enable me to explore whether patterned differences in response exist between the abstract 
and concrete question wording. 
Bivariate Analysis  
Before proceeding with the multivariate analyses, it must first be demonstrated that 
concrete question wording significantly affected response. The bivariate crosstabulation 
between opinion of same-sex marriage and question wording appears in Table 2. The table 
demonstrates that respondents provided a different response when presented with the 
alternate wording, and the chi-square test of independence shows that the difference is 
statistically significant (χ2=29.39, p<.001). The distribution for both question wordings has 
the majority of respondents in the “strongly opposed” category, but in eyeing the discrepancy 
in terms of column percentages, it appears that, as hypothesized, respondents were more 
likely to be “strongly opposed” when presented with the concrete question wording. Of all 
the discrepancies by response category, the difference within the “strongly opposed” 
category is most pronounced, with an additional 3.8 percent falling in the category when 
presented with the alternate wording. 
Alternate Explanations 
Before I proceed with my analysis and conclude that the observed disparity is truly 
the result of differential wording, I shall first briefly address three plausible alternate 
explanations: (1) the observed differences result from the fact that the two questions were 
asked at different points in time; (2) the observed differences are the result of context effects; 
and (3) the observed differences are the result of differential samples. I do not believe that 
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objections (2) and (3) are substantial enough to merit a lengthy discussion. Suffice it to say 
that I explored both possibilities and found only a negligible amount of evidence to support 
them.16 Alternate explanation (1), however, seems to be more plausible, and I shall thus 
devote considerable attention to it. 
The first version of the same-sex marriage question was administered between 
November 19, 2003 and March 21, 2004, whereas the second question was administered 
between March 1, 2004 and September 7, 2004. Therefore, the questions were asked over 
different periods, with the exception of a brief period in March 2004 in which both questions 
were asked. As a result, it is possible that the observed differences between the two items on 
same-sex marriage are simply the result of the questions having been asked at different points 
in time. 
 A rolling average of the mean level of opposition to same-sex marriage can be seen 
below in Figure 1. 
                                                 
16
 With regard to question context, despite the fact that the questions were asked over different intervals, both 
questions were preceded by the same question: an item that asked whether the respondent voted in 2000 and, if 
so, for whom. As for differential sampling, I ran chi-square tests comparing the two samples and found only 
minor differences. Moreover, the few differences that were found do not bias the results in a direction that 
would lead to higher opposition to the concrete wording. 
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Data points in the figure were calculated as a five-day moving average to reduce the noise 
associated with daily fluctuations. I imputed the values for all dates on which data were not 
collected by taking the average of the three previous and three successive days on which data 
were collected.17 From the graph, it is clear that, although there are various peaks and 
troughs, the data are more or less stable, with only a slight upward trend in opposition. To 
formally assess the trend for each wording, I conducted Spearman rank correlation tests for 
each question wording. The value of the rank coefficient for the first question wording was 
.0376 (p<.01), which suggests that the data show a slight positive trend. By contrast, the rank 
coefficient for the second question wording was statistically non-significant, suggesting that 
the data have no appreciable trend. 
                                                 
17
 For example, to determine the value for November 27, 2003 (Thanksgiving), I pooled the data from 
November 24-26 and November 28-30 and took their mean. 
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To further explore the possibility that the observed discrepancy is the result of the 
time that each question was asked, I ran a series of chi-square tests to determine whether data 
significantly differ by month. In addition, I ran chi-square tests to evaluate whether opinion 
fluctuated significantly around important events related to same-sex marriage that took place 
at the national level over the course of the survey (see Appendix for a list of events). With 
regard to month of survey, all chi-square tests, with the exception of one (to be discussed 
below), were statistically non-significant. Likewise, none of the chi-square tests regarding 
fluctuation around key national events was significant.18 
One chi-square test regarding the independence of data by month proved to be 
significant. Indeed, public opinion of same-sex marriage from August 2004 was significantly 
different from opinion in July (χ2=7.93, p<.05). To determine the direction and strength of 
the difference, I acquired a gamma statistic for the comparison between July and August. The 
gamma statistic was .0611 (ASE=.027), which suggests that opposition was only slightly 
higher in August than in July. In addition, I tested whether the distribution of opinion in 
August differed significantly from the distribution obtained during the period in March 
wherein both questions were asked; the test was non-significant, suggesting that the data in 
August were not significantly higher than the data collected in March. 
In sum, it does not appear that the observed difference between the two questions is 
the result of differential timing. Only one month of the survey proved to be significantly 
different from other months. In addition, although the data were, for the most part, collected 
over different intervals, there was a 21-day period, from March 1, 2004 to March 21, 2004, 
                                                 
18
 To test whether opinion fluctuated because of key national events, I compiled the data from ten days prior and 
ten days after each event, excluding the actual date of the event to ensure temporal ordering, and compared the 
results. For example, for the first same-sex marriage to take place in the United States, an event that occurred in 
Massachusetts on May 17, 2004, I compared the data from May 7, 2004 through May 16, 2004 to the data from 
May 18, 2004 through May 27, 2004. 
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wherein both questions were asked. During this period, the discrepancy between responses to 
the two questions was nearly identical to the observed discrepancy for the full samples.19 
Nevertheless, because a chi-square test demonstrated that the August data differ significantly 
from July, I will include a control in my subsequent multivariate models for respondents who 
were surveyed in the month of August or September.20 
Multivariate Analysis 
The bivariate crosstabulation does not control for other covariates that might have led 
to the observed disparity in response. To test whether question wording truly acts as a 
predictor of heightened opposition, I ran a multivariate ordinal logistic model including all 
covariates, the results of which appear in Table 3. 
From the table, we can see that the coefficient for concrete wording is statistically 
significant and that the concrete question made respondents nearly 15 percent as likely to be 
in the “strongly oppose” category than in either “somewhat oppose,” “somewhat favor,” or 
“strongly favor.” Thus, even after controlling for a host of covariates known to predict 
opinion of same-sex marriage, concrete question wording persists as a strong predictor of 
opposition. Despite concerns about time of survey accounting for the observed disparity, the 
dummy variable for surveys conducted in August or September was non-significant, further 
demonstrating that the observed disparity was not a function of the questions being asked 
over different intervals. 
                                                 
19
 The divide between levels of “strong” opposition during the 21-day period was 3.52 percent, and the 
discrepancy for the full sample of both questions was 3.83 percent. To assess whether the difference over the 
21-day period was the result of differential sampling, I conducted a series of chi-square tests on key 
sociodemographic characteristics, none of which reached the level of statistical significance. 
 
20
 The number of respondents who were surveyed in either August or September was 2,706, or 16.91 percent of 
the sample. 
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To determine whether the addition of the question wording variable significantly 
improves the model, I ran a likelihood-ratio test (not shown in table) comparing a model 
without the question wording and month of survey variables to the model shown in Table 3; 
the test was statistically significant (χ2=25.38, p<.001), demonstrating that the addition of the 
two variables significantly improves the quality of the model. In addition, because 
likelihood-ratio tests do not take into account the additional variables in the model, I 
compared the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) of the two models. The difference 
between the BICs was larger than 7, indicating that there is strong evidence to support the 
inclusion of the wording variable. 
As for the other variables in the model, the results were consistent with most research 
on opinions of same-sex marriage and sexual prejudice (Herek 1994; Yang 1997). Women 
were 42 percent less likely to be in a higher oppositional category than were men. Likewise, 
age proved to be a significant predictor of opposition: an additional 10 years of age 
corresponded to a 26 percent increase in the odds of higher opposition.  
Perhaps the most unexpected finding from the full-model regression is that black 
respondents were substantially more likely than whites to be in a higher oppositional 
category. As aforementioned, research on the relationship between race and sexual prejudice 
has been quite inconsistent. Some research has shown that blacks are more intolerant of 
homosexuality (Levitt and Klassen 1974), while other research has found the opposite 
(Schneider and Lewis 1984). Lewis (2003) found that, although less tolerant of 
homosexuality, black respondents were moderately more supportive of gay civil liberties 
than were whites. My data show just the opposite. Indeed, black respondents in my sample 
were 69 percent more likely to be more opposed to same-sex marriage than were white 
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respondents. This finding adds yet another complication to the already muddled 
understanding of the relationship between race and gay rights. 
Consistent with previous research, however, were the results for education and 
region. The effect of education was monotonic, with each additional educational attainment 
leading to a decrease in likelihood of higher opposition; the most significant decline in odds 
came for respondents with a graduate or professional degree, who were 65 percent less likely 
to be in a higher oppositional category than were respondents with a high school degree or 
less. Regionally, respondents from the Midwest and South were substantially more likely to 
provide a more opposed response than were respondents from the Northeast, while 
respondents from the West were not significantly different from respondents in the 
Northeast. Southern respondents were 29 percent more likely than Northeasterners to be in a 
higher oppositional category, and respondents from the Midwest were 16 percent more likely 
than Northeastern respondents to provide a more opposed response. 
All of the results for the religious variables were consistent with findings in previous 
research. Born-again Christians were more than two times as likely as non-born-again 
Christians to be in a higher oppositional category. Likewise, church attendance proved to be 
a strong predictor of opposition, with the greatest opposition coming from respondents who 
attend religious services once a week or more. Frequent churchgoers were more than twice as 
likely to provide a more opposed response than were respondents who indicated that they 
never attend religious services. Differences by religious affiliation were less pronounced, 
with Catholics not differing significantly from Protestants, a finding which is probably due to 
the lack of distinction among Protestant denominations. Respondents claiming no 
denomination were substantially less likely than Protestants to give a more opposed response. 
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To test whether the religiously non-affiliated also differed from Catholics, I rotated the 
denominational reference group (results not shown). Respondents claiming no religious 
affiliation were also significantly less likely to provide a more opposed response than were 
Catholics. 
Political ideology and party affiliation also produced results consistent with previous 
research. Political conservatives were significantly more likely to provide a more negative 
response than either moderates or liberals, the latter being nearly 80 percent less likely to 
indicate higher opposition. Likewise, Republicans were more likely to report higher 
opposition than either Democrats or political Independents. 
Lastly, the variable controlling for the month of the survey was statistically non-
significant, further dispelling the alternate explanation that the response difference was due 
to the questions being asked over different intervals. The results from the multivariate 
regression attest to the observed disparity resulting from alternate question wording, to the 
extent that respondents to the concrete question wording were 15 percent more likely to 
provide a more oppositional response than were respondents to the abstract wording. 
Predicted Probabilities 
Using the coefficients derived from the separate models by question wording (results 
not shown), I calculated predicted probabilities for selected subgroups to determine whether 
the concrete question wording affected respondents disproportionately. The predicted 
probabilities are seen below in Table 4. 
Starting with gender, we can see that the difference in predicted probabilities is not as 
pronounced as would be expected given previous research on gender and sexual prejudice; 
the predicted probability for women was .052 higher for the concrete wording, while the 
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probability for men was .049 higher. Although the difference is not large, this result clearly 
runs counter to my hypothesis. The reason for this result is unclear. One possible explanation 
deals with the order in which the concrete terms were provided to respondents: “two women” 
always came second. Previous research in survey response has shown that recency effects, 
the tendency for respondents to choose options at the end of a list, are common in telephone 
surveys because the mode is entirely auditory (Krosnick and Alwin 1987; Tourangeau, Rips, 
and Rasinski 2000), and it is possible that the order of the question wording affected 
visualization. Moreover, previous research has shown that there are no differences in 
attitudes of men and women toward lesbians (Kerns and Fine 1994), which would explain 
why there was so little difference between the change in predicted probability for men and 
women. Although recency effects are most often associated with the order of response 
categories, it is possible that these effects apply to the visualization process as well. 
 Probability differences by educational attainment correspond to expectation. The 
predicted probability of strong opposition for respondents with a high school degree or less 
increased by .076 when given the concrete wording. The difference in probability for 
respondents with a professional or graduate degree was non-significant. 
 Similarly, regional differences were as hypothesized. Predicted probabilities for 
respondents from the Northeast and the West were not significantly different by question 
wording. By contrast, respondents from the Midwest and South had markedly higher 
probability of being “strongly opposed.” The probability of strong opposition for Southern 
respondents was .057 higher, and the probability for Midwestern respondents was .082 
higher. 
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 The predicted probability differences for born-again Christians and those not 
identifying as born-again were both significant, though born-again Christians experienced a 
slightly larger increase. Although the increases in probability were comparable—.045 for 
born-again Christians, .040 for other respondents—the group associated with heightened 
sexual prejudice saw a higher increase, as expected. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
increase in probability for born-again Christians is made all the more significant because the 
probability of strong opposition was already extremely high to begin with (.771 with the 
abstract wording). Thus, although the two groups saw a similar increase, born-again 
Christians moved from an already elevated probability to an even higher probability, with 8 
in 10 born-again Christians being likely to give a response of “strongly opposed” when 
provided with the question employing concrete terminology. 
 Differences by frequency of church attendance also matched expectation. The 
predicted probability of strong opposition among respondents who indicated that they never 
attend church did not differ significantly by question wording. By contrast, the concrete 
wording led to a .039 increase in predicted probability for frequent church attendees. This 
increase in probability, as in the case of born-again Christians, built on an already high 
probability of strong opposition. 
 By religious affiliation, Catholics and Protestants saw near-equal increases in 
predicted probability of strong opposition, while the non-affiliated saw no appreciable 
increase. The predicted probability for Catholics rose by .054 when presented with the 
concrete question wording, and the probability for Protestant respondents increased by .056. 
Although it is strange that Catholics and Protestants increased by a similar margin, this is 
likely due once again to the lack of distinction among Protestant denominations. Research in 
 32 
the sociology of religion shows that, while Evangelical Protestants are markedly more 
conservative than other Christians, mainline Protestants are scarcely different from Catholics 
in terms of political liberalism and tolerance for civil liberties (Finlay and Walther 2003; 
Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). 
 Politically, the results conformed to expectation. The predicted probability of strong 
opposition for political conservatives rose by .035 when presented with the concrete wording, 
while political liberals were unaffected. Likewise, the concrete wording led Republicans to 
be substantially more likely—an increase of .058 in predicted probability—to strongly 
oppose same-sex marriage. Respondents identifying as Democrats experienced no significant 
change in probability. 
Subsample Regression Models 
Comparing predicted probabilities of strong opposition demonstrated that certain 
subgroups were more likely to be strongly opposed to same-sex marriage by question 
wording, but it remains to be demonstrated that the change in wording led to a general 
increase in opposition by subgroup. To test this hypothesis, I ran individual regression 
models, including only respondents of a given sociodemographic group, to determine 
whether question wording had an effect on response. As in the full-sample model, all 
subsample models control for surveys completed in either August or September. The results 
for the subsample regressions appear below in Table 5. 
From the table, we can see that question wording was a significant predictor of 
opposition among both men and women, but the effect was larger for men. When presented 
with the wording that employed concrete terminology, men were 19 percent more likely to 
provide a more opposed response, while women were 12 percent more likely. In contrast to 
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the predicted probabilities, this finding conforms to expectations. Thus, we can conclude that, 
although not necessarily more likely to provide a “strongly opposed” response, men were 
more likely to report higher opposition than were women when presented with the concrete 
question. 
 In terms of educational attainment, respondents with a high school degree or less 
were 35 percent more likely to be more opposed to same-sex marriage when receiving the 
question with concrete terminology. Respondents with a graduate or professional degree 
were not significantly affected by the change in wording. 
 Regionally, only respondents from the Midwest and the South were significantly 
affected by the concrete wording. Respondents from the Midwest were 31 percent more 
likely to be in a higher oppositional category when provided the alternate wording, while the 
odds that a Southern respondent would be in a higher category increased by 18 percent. 
 The religious subsamples once again conformed to expectations. Born-again 
Christians were 19 percent more likely to provide a more opposed response when given the 
concrete wording. By contrast, respondents who did not identify as “born-again” saw a more 
modest increase (13 percent) in likelihood of reporting higher opposition. Respondents who 
reported that they do not attend church were not significantly affected by the change in 
wording, whereas the odds that a frequent churchgoer would be in a higher category were 18 
percent higher when provided the concrete wording. In terms of religious affiliation, only 
Protestants were significantly more likely to be in a higher oppositional category; neither 
Catholics nor the religiously non-affiliated experienced any increase in odds. For Protestants, 
the increase was nearly 23 percent in the likelihood of reporting higher opposition to same-
sex marriage. 
 34 
 Finally, the effect of question wording was not equally distributed by political 
ideology or party affiliation. Although liberals were not significantly affected by the concrete 
wording, conservatives were 17 percent more likely to be in a higher response category. 
Similarly, Democrats were unaffected by the change in wording, but the odds of a more 
oppositional response increased by 26 percent for Republicans when provided the concrete 
wording. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I demonstrate that the terminology employed in question wording 
affects response in a most peculiar way. I compare the responses to two similarly worded 
questions from the 2004 NAES dealing with same-sex marriage, with the only exception 
between the questions being the words used to define same-sex couples. The question that 
employed more concrete terms—“two men” and “two women”—as opposed to abstracted 
roles—“gays” and “lesbians”—provoked more opposition from respondents, but the 
differences were not evenly distributed. Instead, the question wording disproportionately 
affected sociodemographic groups associated with higher levels of sexual prejudice. 
 Drawing upon research in cognitive psychology and linguistics, I argue that the 
observed disparity in response to the two questions resulted from the greater tendency for 
concrete language to evoke visualization. Because the concrete wording was more likely to 
elicit a mental image, it was also more likely to provoke respondents who would be more 
likely to find the image objectionable to provide a more oppositional response. The data 
support my argument.  
Although the effects were by no means earth-shattering, the phenomenon is 
nonetheless intriguing. Previous analyses of question wording effects have focused 
exclusively on the denotations or connotations of different words. My analysis expands the 
purview to include the mental imagery evoked by wording. Survey designers should take 
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note to consider the potential for visualization to affect response and should seek to tailor 
their survey instruments to minimize its impact. 
My analysis confirms the idea that animates the political correctness movement: 
language affects understanding. For example, in confronting the importance of language with 
regard to sexual prejudice, the American Psychological Association issued a report devoted 
to avoiding heterosexual bias in language (1991). Although the report does not advise one 
way or the other regarding using the terms “two men” or “two women,” it does advise its 
readers to abstain from using the word “homosexual,” which emphasizes the sexual 
component of gay lifestyle, opting instead for “gay” and “lesbian,” which incorporate the 
social aspects as well. The lexicographer Theodore Bernstein (1999) tells us why the term 
“gay” is to be preferred: it originated in the gay community and is the preferred term among 
members of the community. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the use of the preferred 
terminology would be less likely to provoke survey respondents into providing a more 
oppositional response. 
In addition, my research adds to the growing body of research exploring the role of 
disgust sensitivity in moral valuation. A powerful emotion, disgust circumscribes the 
boundaries of normative behavior. In terms of sexuality, the expression of disgust is often 
used to devalue any non-heterosexual lifestyle. Previous research in this area has 
demonstrated the varying degree to which disgust informs moral valuation, with political 
conservatives being most likely to view disgust as relevant, particularly for sociomoral issues 
like same-sex marriage (Haidt and Graham 2007; Inbar et al. in progress). I build on this 
research by showing that disgust can be triggered by language. Whether conscious or 
subconscious, the effect of concrete terminology provoked survey respondents to provide a 
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more oppositional response, and the effect was strongest among sociodemographic groups 
associated with heightened sexual prejudice. 
It is important to take note of several limitations to this study. First, although the data 
conform to my hypotheses with regard to visualization and disgust, because my data were 
taken from a secondary dataset, the effect can only be inferred. I was unable to interact with 
respondents to uncover the cognitive processes in the response process. Rather, they could 
only be inferred from the data. Future research should look to make use of the promising 
development of cognitive interviewing (Willis 2004) to determine the extent to which survey 
respondents report mental imagery and the ways in which the images affect their response. 
One alternative explanation for the observed patterned response differences—and one 
that I am unable to test directly—is that the terms “men” and “women” could resonate more 
strongly among certain language communities. The burgeoning field of sociolinguistics has 
documented at great length the ways in which different communities employ different 
manners of speech (Romaine 2000). Moreover, research has shown that different political 
communities, or “microcultures,” employ competing repertoires when deliberating political 
issues (Perrin 2005). Thus, it is entirely possible that the terms “men” and “women” more 
strongly resonated with some respondents more than with others, particularly to the extent 
that the communities use the terms with reference to same-sex marriage.  
In this line of thinking, I am reminded of the constant refrain among many opponents 
of same-sex marriage: marriage is between one man and one woman, a sentiment echoed by 
President Bush in a number of his speeches on the subject (e.g., CNN.com). Because 
opponents of same-sex marriage are more likely to hear and presumably use this linguistic 
construction when discussing or thinking about same-sex marriage, it is possible that the 
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question wording either consciously or unconsciously triggered a connection to it, thus 
provoking respondents to report greater opposition. Without direct contact with respondents, 
I am unable to determine which explanation applies, but I believe that there is sufficient 
evidence to support the argument I make regarding the role of visualization. 
The second limitation of this study is that the data on religious affiliation were not 
delineated enough to explore the finer distinctions by denomination, particularly among 
Protestant respondents. Although I suspect that conservative Protestants are likely to be 
affected by the use of concrete terminology with regard to same-sex marriage, the 2004 
NAES data do not permit a formal test of the hypothesis. Moreover, my measure of religious 
belief—whether a respondent identified as born-again—acted only as a proxy measure. 
Future research on this phenomenon should seek to acquire more comprehensive measures of 
religious belonging and belief to explore whether the phenomenon conforms to expectation. 
Third, because I did not collect the data nor design the questionnaire myself, I was 
unable to determine whether recency effects came into play in the visualization process. With 
telephone interviews, research has shown that respondents have a tendency to select response 
categories that are listed later (Krosnick and Alwin 1987), but this research looked only at the 
ordering of response categories. Future research should look to explore whether recency 
effects—or primacy effects, in the case of self-administered surveys—also apply to 
visualization and whether this has any effect on subsequent response. 
Finally, my data did not include any measure of respondents’ attitudes toward gender 
roles, which previous research has shown to correlate strongly with attitudes toward gay men 
and lesbians (Kerns and Fine 1994). It would be interesting to see whether adherence to 
traditional gender roles, particularly among male respondents, significantly affects the 
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interpretation of imagery. Future research should aim to acquire these data to determine what 
effect, if any, they have on the reaction to visualization. 
 In documenting the phenomenon of the effect of language on sexual prejudice, I have 
shown what many political consultants already know to be true: language matters. Perhaps 
chief among them is famed political consultant Frank Luntz, who co-authored the “Contract 
with America” that helped Republicans reclaim both houses of Congress in 1994. Revered by 
the Right and reviled by the Left, Luntz (2007) argues that “it’s not what you say, it’s what 
people hear” (267). Indeed, and to that, I would add: it’s also what people see.  
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Appendix 
Key Events in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate 
November 18, 2003 – Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decides Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), which rules that the exclusion 
of “qualified same-sex couples from access to civil marriage violates Massachusetts law” 
(Massachusetts Supreme Court website). 
February 4, 2004 – Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clarifies its order to the 
legislature to allow same-sex marriages, contending that civil unions will not suffice (Cohen 
2004). 
February 12, 2004 – Gavin Newsom, newly-elected mayor of San Francisco, issues a 
directive to the city-county clerk to issue marriage certificates to same-sex couples. Marriage 
certificates are distributed until March 11, 2004 and are eventually nullified by the California 
Supreme Court (LexisNexis). 
February 24, 2004 – President Bush announces his support for an amendment to the 
Constitution that would ban same-sex marriage (CNN.com). 
May 17, 2004 – The first-ever legal same-sex marriage takes place in Massachusetts. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables (N=16,003) 
Gender N Percent 
Female 8,821 55.1% 
Male 7,182 44.9% 
Race     
White 13,865 86.6% 
Black 1,251 7.8% 
Other 887 5.5% 
Education     
HS graduate or less 5,164 32.3% 
Some college 4,584 28.6% 
Bachelor's degree 3,935 24.6% 
Graduate or professional degree 2,320 14.5% 
Region     
Northeast 3,018 18.9% 
Midwest 4,019 25.1% 
South 5,639 35.2% 
West 3,327 20.8% 
Born-again Christian     
No 9,772 61.1% 
Yes 6,231 38.9% 
Frequency of Service Attendance     
Never 2,879 18.0% 
Infrequent 6,253 39.1% 
Weekly or more 6,871 42.9% 
Religious Affiliation     
Protestant 9,594 60.0% 
Catholic 4,195 26.2% 
Mormon 275 1.7% 
Jewish 369 2.3% 
No affiliation 1,570 9.8% 
Political Ideology     
Conservative 6,420 40.1% 
Moderate 5,884 36.7% 
Liberal 3,699 23.1% 
Party Affiliation     
Republican 5,440 34.0% 
Democrat 5,283 33.0% 
Independent 4,393 27.5% 
Other 887 5.5% 
Question Wording 
    
Abstract 6,643 41.5% 
Concrete 9,360 58.5% 
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Table 2. Crosstabulation of Opinion of Same-Sex Marriage by Question Wording 
 Abstract Wording Concrete Wording Total 
Strongly Favor 1,265  1,746  3,011  
 (19.0) (18.7) (18.8) 
Somewhat Favor 1,164  1,402  2,566  
 (17.5) (15.0) (16.0) 
Somewhat Oppose 741  960  1,701  
 (11.2) (10.3) (10.6) 
Strongly Oppose 3,473  5,252  8,725  
 (52.3) (56.1) (54.5) 
Total 6,643  9,360  16,003  
  (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
χ
2
= 29.39, p<.001    
Column percentages in parentheses.   
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Table 3. Multivariate OLR Model of Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage, 
Reported as Odds Ratios (N=16,003) 
Female 0.582*** 
Age 1.024*** 
Racea  
Black 1.699*** 
Other 1.492*** 
Educationb  
Some college 0.626*** 
Bachelor's degree 0.436*** 
Graduate or professional degree 0.351*** 
Regionc  
Midwest 1.157** 
South 1.286*** 
West 0.948 
Born-again Christian 2.345*** 
Frequency of Service Attendanced  
Infrequent 1.179** 
Weekly or more 2.224*** 
Religious Affiliatione  
Catholic 0.937 
Mormon 2.357*** 
Jewish 0.497*** 
No affiliation 0.694*** 
Political Ideologyf  
Moderate 0.460*** 
Liberal 0.218*** 
Party Affiliationg  
Democrat 0.450*** 
Independent 0.578*** 
Other 0.623*** 
Concrete Wording 1.148*** 
August or after 1.090 
  
Model χ2 6638.87*** 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05  
  
a Reference category is white.  
b Reference category is HS graduate or less.  
c Reference category is Northeast.  
d Reference category is never.  
e Reference category is Protestant.  
f Reference category is conservative.  
g Reference category is Republican.  
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Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Strong Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage by Question 
Wording 
 Abstract Wording Concrete Wording Difference 
Gender     
Female 0.481 0.533 0.052* 
Male 0.590 0.640 0.049* 
Education     
HS graduate or less 0.670 0.746 0.076* 
Graduate or professional degree 0.339 0.374 0.035 
Region     
Northeast 0.418 0.439 0.022 
Midwest 0.529 0.612 0.082* 
South 0.637 0.693 0.057* 
West 0.446 0.469 0.024 
Born-again Christian     
No 0.360 0.399 0.040* 
Yes 0.771 0.816 0.045* 
Frequency of Service Attendance     
Never 0.270 0.273 0.003 
Weekly or more 0.738 0.777 0.039* 
Religious Affiliation     
No affiliation 0.203 0.191 -0.012 
Catholic 0.443 0.497 0.054* 
Protestant 0.636 0.692 0.056* 
Political Ideology     
Liberal 0.200 0.220 0.020 
Conservative 0.783 0.818 0.035* 
Party Affiliation     
Democrat 0.369 0.398 0.029 
Republican 0.738 0.796 0.058* 
* indicates that 95% confidence intervals do not overlap.   
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Table 5. Effect of Question Wording for Selected Subsamples, 
Reported as Odds Ratios 
Gender  
Female 1.116* 
Male 1.191*** 
Education  
HS graduate or less 1.350*** 
Graduate or professional degree ns 
Region  
Northeast ns 
Midwest 1.306*** 
South 1.181** 
West ns 
Born-again Christian  
No 1.133** 
Yes 1.191** 
Frequency of Service Attendance  
Never ns 
Weekly or more 1.183** 
Religious Affiliation  
No Affiliation ns 
Catholic ns 
Protestant 1.228*** 
Political Ideology  
Liberal ns 
Conservative 1.168* 
Party Affiliation  
Democrat ns 
Republican 1.259*** 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; ns non-significant   
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